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ABSTRACT 
Validation of best-estimate codes is a necessary step to prove their applicability to calculate accident 
scenarios, including the course of events. It shall demonstrate that those physical phenomena, which 
are important for a scenario, are calculated appropriately. A common list of 113 thermal-hydraulic 
phenomena is provided, based on previous reports of OECD/NEA-CSNI and IAEA, including Separate 
Effects Test (SET) facilities and Integral Test facilities of PWRs and BWRs, VVERs, Advanced Reac-
tors, as well as Containment. Added objective of the activity is to show that the list of phenomena is 
applicable to the major number of water-cooled reactors. Twelve reactor types are considered for the 
characterization of 47 accident scenarios cross-linked with the identified phenomena. Focus of this 
paper is on the updated identification of the list of thermal-hydraulic phenomena. 
1 Introduction 
A necessary and important basis to perform safety analysis are best estimate computer 
codes. Validation of these codes is a necessary step to prove their applicability to calculate 
accident scenarios, including the course of events. For example, thermal-hydraulic computer 
codes shall demonstrate to calculate the behaviour in the primary and secondary systems of 
a nuclear power plant before performing safety analyses [1]. Two types of experimental facili-
ties have been used for thermal hydraulic system code validation: Separate effects experi-
ments and integral test facilities. Whereas integral test facilities are usually designed to follow 
the behaviour of a reactor system in various off-normal conditions or accident transients, 
separate effects tests focus on the behaviour of a single component, or on the characteristics 
of one thermal-hydraulic phenomenon or a limited number of phenomena. 
Already in the year 1987, the OECD/NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations 
(CSNI) published a document that identified systematically a set of physical phenomena and 
tests, which were considered to provide the best basis for the assessment of the perform-
ance of thermal hydraulic codes, "CSNI Code Validation Matrix of Thermohydraulic Codes for 
LWR LOCA and Transients" [2]. The report included all typical phenomena expected to occur 
in plant transients and LOCA analyses. After publishing this report, it turned out that contin-
ued comparison of calculations with additional separate effects test (SET) data is also nec-
essary to consider particular  applications  of codes,  especially  where  a quantitative  
evaluation  of  prediction accuracy is required for best estimate computer codes, as well as 
for code model improvement. Based on these needs, the OECD/NEA-CSNI issued an inde-
pendent and separate two-volume report on separate effects tests validation matrix in 1994 
[3]. An updated integral test validation matrix report was issued in 1996 [4], a VVER valida-
tion matrix in 2001 [5], and a containment validation report in 2014 [6]. The construction of 
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such validation matrices is an attempt to collect in a systematic way the best sets of test 
data for code validation, assessment and improvement, including quantitative assess-
ment of uncertainties in the modelling of individual phenomena for the best estimate 
thermal-hydraulic transient computer codes.  
A recent activity in the frame of issuing a book on Thermal-Hydraulics in Nuclear Reactors [7] 
provides a common list of 113 thermal-hydraulic phenomena, based on the previous reports 
of OECD/NEA-CSNI and IAEA [2-13], including SET facilities and Integral Test facilities of 
PWRs and BWRs, VVERs, Advanced and Generation IV Reactors, as well as Containment 
with updated descriptions. Added objective of the activity is to show that the list of phenom-
ena is applicable to the major number of water-cooled reactors. A procedure is proposed to 
connect phenomena, accident scenarios and measured or calculated variables. The proce-
dure yields cross-link tables, making use of the results of reactor calculations derived from 
several documents available from the literature and dealing with selected accident scenarios 
and reactor designs. Twelve reactor types are considered for the characterization of 47 acci-
dent scenarios cross-linked with the identified phenomena. The phenomena are largely af-
fected by geometry and boundary conditions and need suitable modelling capabilities. Two 
main objectives have been pursued:  
a) the description of accident scenarios;  
b) the connection of thermal-hydraulic phenomena to these accident scenarios.  
The accident scenarios are here limited to design basis accidents before loss of core integ-
rity. This paper focusses on the new activity of thermal-hydraulic phenomena.  
2 Thermal-hydraulic phenomena 
Phenomena have been established within the framework of activities performed within inter-
national institutions. They deal here with the condition Design  Basis Accident (DBA), before 
the occurrence of the loss of geometric integrity for the core. DBAs define accident condi-
tions against which a facility has to be designed according to established design criteria, and 
for which the damage to the fuel and the release of radioactive material are kept within au-
thorized limits [14]. Here, the concerned condition comprise some Beyond Design Basis Ac-
cident (BDBA) situations, e.g. in terms of probability of occurrence of a selected Postulated 
Initiating Event (PIE), and in cases outside the DBA boundary, when accident management 
procedures are performed to prevent core degradation, e.g. fast depressurization and feed of 
the secondary side of the  steam generators or the primary side of the reactor. 
A reviewed and combined list of thermal-hydraulic phenomena in alphabetic order is set-up 
in Table 1. Four categories of phenomena are distinguished: Separate effect (S) including 
basic (B), integral effect (I) and phenomena addressing the design of ‘Advanced reactors’ 
(A). Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is considered within these three categories for conven-
tional Light Water Reactors. In case of advanced reactors, both RCS and containment phe-
nomena are considered due to close interconnection of the RCS and containment.  Descrip-
tions of these phenomena will be also provided in the “Thermal-Hydraulics in Nuclear Reac-
tors” book [7] and the former mentioned OECD/NEA-CSNI and IAEA documents [3, 4, 5, 6, 
8-13]. 
Apart from integral test (I) phenomena, a different group named "Basic Phenomena" (B) has 
been added to the SET (S) phenomena. Each phenomenon in this group can be character-
ised as independent of other phenomena and is of a constitutive nature for the two-phase 
flow. Basic phenomena are the transfer processes at the interface between different fluids, 
like liquid and steam or a non-condensable gas, and solid surfaces facing the fluid. They 
comprise momentum, heat and mass transfer, which have been divided into  
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- evaporation due to depressurization including at geometric discontinuities (B-3),  
- evaporation due to heat input (B-4)  
- condensation due to pressurization (B-2)  
- condensation due to heat removal (B-1)  
- interfacial friction in vertical flow (B-6)  
- interfacial friction in horizontal flow (B-5)  
wall to fluid friction (B-9)  
- pressure drops at geometry discontinuities (B-7)  
- pressure wave propagation (B-8). 
With regard to basic phenomena, the possible steam generation at abrupt discontinuities, i.e. 
caused by the total pressure drop is included in the phenomenon B-3. Downstream of a 
geometric discontinuity, e.g. in the presence of a sharp edge possibly combined with high 
Reynolds-number flow, the local pressure may decrease below the saturation pressure cor-
responding to the fluid temperature, vaporization may occur and void may appear which be-
come sub-cooled void because of the sudden pressure recovery. Subcooled void may affect 
the total pressure drop and, if present, the two-phase critical flow in the downstream geome-
try.  
In the six equation models used in some thermal-hydraulic safety computer codes, the con-
stitutive laws are intended to model these basic transfers between phases. The method of 
discretization for the fluid dynamics, and the numerical solution, significantly affect the calcu-
lation of pressure wave propagation. Basic phenomena govern all the fluid behaviour during 
an accident sequence, so they are inevitably important for nuclear safety. 
In most cases of practical interest there is no direct measurement of basic phenomena for 
two phase flow. They can be only evaluated on the basis of global measurements (e.g., 
pressure difference, pressure, temperature). Models are necessary to evaluate the basic 
transfers from the global measurements. Correlations are set up from these models. How-
ever, it is important to realize that the use of these correlations is dependent of the chosen 
model.  Normally, the correlations should be used in a way, which is consistent with their 
derivation. Usually, the basic phenomena are treated as independent of modelling. With the 
present state of knowledge, models employed in codes give a large range of differences on 
evaluation of basic phenomena. However, the global thermal-hydraulic behaviour is never-
theless predicted quite similarly by different approaches. 
Integral tests are carried out in scaled test facilities and provide data on the overall behaviour 
of a simulated reactor system during a LOCA or transient. These tests are being used for 
code assessment purposes relating to overall reactor behaviour. A definition of sets of such 
tests has been provided in [4]. These facilities have a complicated configuration and are ex-
pensive to operate. Compromises, for instance with respect to scaling to real plants, are in-
evitable. In addition, the instrumentation for measurements of parameters governing different 
two-phase flow phenomena is limited. This makes the integral tests less suitable for detailed 
investigations of specific two-phase flow phenomena. Consequently, this also requires in as-
sessment analyses that the code user is very confident of which phenomena prevail during 
the course of a transient in order to avoid "good results but for the wrong reasons" (compen-
sating errors). 
 
Separate effects tests are employed not only to develop correlations of specific processes 
but also to investigate individual or localised two-phase phenomena, which in most cases are 
dependent on several specific processes. These kinds of tests are also used to characterise 
the behaviour of single components such as pumps or steam separators. 
 
The interactions with other phenomena or components as in a full scale light water reactors 
are either imposed by external boundary conditions on the test, or are purposely eliminated. 
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In fact, an important consideration in the design of separate effects tests is to have well de-
fined boundary conditions. In some cases, the test section in a separate effects test is locally 
in full scale or very near to full scale. This minimises the concern about scale effects. On the 
other hand, in all separate effects tests it is important to evaluate the influence of the chosen 
boundary conditions on measured para meters. 
 
In separate effects tests the instrumentation for measurements of t wo-phase flow parameters 
can be quite extensive. Thus, data for assessment of details of the models used in the codes 
to simulate localised phenomena can be provided, and this can help in understanding the in-
teractions of different processes that combine to produce the overall phenomena of interest. 
The data have also proved to be valuable when evaluating prediction uncertainties of specific 
phenomena at or near full scale. 
 
Table 1 - List of phenomena 
ID 
PHENOMENA – TABLE 1 PART 1 
OF 2 
TYPE REACTOR DETAILS & NOTES 
S-1 Accumulator behaviour SETF  Mainly PWR 
I-1 Asymmetric loop behavior ITF PWR  
I-2 Asymmetry due to the presence of a 
dam 
ITF  Shutdown conditions 
A-1 Behavior of check valves 
Advanced Reactors Also containment 
A-2 Behavior of containment emergency 
systems (e.g. Passive Containment 
Cooling System) 
A-3 Behavior of core make-up tanks 
A-4 Behavior of density locks  
A-5 Behavior of emergency heat ex-
changers including Passive Residual 
Heat Removal and Isolation Conden-
ser 
A-6 Behavior of large pools of liquid 
I-3 Blowdown ITF/SETF/Basic Phenomenological time 
window rather than 
phenomenon 
I-4 Boiler condenser mode (of Natural 
Circulation)  
ITF PWR-
OTSG 
 
 Boil-off, 
included in S-26, Heat Transfer 
(CHF/DNB, post-CHF) in core   
ITF/SETF/Basic See also B-4-
Evaporation due to 
heat input 
S-2 Boron mixing and transport (also A-
12-stratification of boron) 
SETF PWR Also ITF 
S-3 Counter-Current Flow/ Limitation 
(CCF/CCFL)-Channel inlet orifice 
SETF 
BWR 
 
S-4 CCF/CCFL-Downcomer 
PWR 
 
S-5 CCF/CCFL-HL & CL  
S-6 CCF/CCFL-SG tubes  
S-7 CCF/CCFL-Surgeline  
S-8 CCF/CCFL-Upper core tie plate N/A  
 Centrifugal pump   See Impeller pump 
I-5 Channel and bypass axial flow and 
void distribution 
ITF 
BWR 
 
I-6 Collapsed level behaviour in down-
comer 
ITF 
BWR 
See also phase separa-
tion 
B-1 Condensation due to heat removal Basic N/A  
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B-2 Condensation due to pressurization Basic   
S-9 Condensation in stratified conditions-
Horizontal Pipes  
SETF 
 
 
S-10 Condensation in stratified conditions-
PRZ 
PWR 
 
S-11 Condensation in stratified conditions-
SG-PS 
 
S-12 Condensation in stratified conditions-
SG-SS & BWR-Pressure Suppression 
Pool  
 
Also BWR wet-well 
 Containment pressure and tempera-
ture  
ITF  
See I-18- Pressure-
temp. increase & boil-
ing due to energy and 
mass input and S-42- 
Natural convection and 
H2 distribution 
I-7 Core thermal-hydraulics 
ITF BWR 
See global multi-
dimensional 
 Core wide void and flow distribution 
ITF  
See global multi-
dimensional 
S-13 Control Rod Guide Tube flashing  SETF BWR  
A-7 Critical and supercritical flow in dis-
charge pipes  
Advanced Reactors  
Also CANDU and 
RBMK 
 Critical flow 
  
See Two-Phase Critical 
Flow 
 Critical Power Ratio ITF BWR See HT CHF 
 De-entrainment   See Entrainment 
 Depressurization   See Blowdown 
S-14 ECC bypass/Downcomer penetration  SETF PWR  
 ECC mixing and condensation 
ITF  
See liquid-vapour mix-
ing 
S-15 Entrainment/De-entrainment-Core 
SETF 
  
S-16 Entrainment/De-entrainment-
Downcomer 
 
 
S-17 Entrainment/De-entrainment-Hot leg 
with ECCI 
PWR 
 
S-18 Entrainment/De-entrainment-SG mix-
ing chamber 
 
S-19 Entrainment/De-entrainment-SG 
tubes 
 
S-20 Entrainment/De-entrainment-UP   
B-3 Evaporation due to depressurization 
(including at geometric discontinui-
ties*)    
Basic  
* reversible part 
B-4 Evaporation due to heat input Basic   
I-8 Flow through openings  ITF  Shutdown conditions 
S-21 Global multi-dimensional fluid tem-
perature, void and flow distribution-
Core   
SETF 
 
 
S-22 Global multi-dimensional fluid tem-
perature, void and flow distribution-
Downcomer 
 
 
S-23 Global multi-dimensional fluid tem-
perature, void and flow distribution-
SG SS 
PWR 
 
S-24 Global multi-dimensional fluid tem-   
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perature, void and flow distribution-
UP 
A-8 Gravity driven reflood Advanced Reactors  
S-25 Horizontal heated channel Heat 
Transfer (HT) [added phenomenon] 
SETF CANDU 
Including HT below 
S-26 HT (natural convection, forced con-
vection, sub-cooled nucleate boiling, 
saturated nucleate boiling, CHF/DNB, 
post-CHF)-Core, SG, structures   
SETF 
 
Including VVER condi-
tions 
S-27 HT [radiation]-core   
S-28 HT [condensation]-SG structures   
A-9 HT condensation in containment 
structures, with or w/o non-
condensable  
Advanced Reactors 
Also containment 
S-29 Impeller pump behavior SETF  External pumps 
 Instability (in boiling channels) 
SETF/ITF 
See S-44- Parallel 
channel effects and in-
stabilities 
B-5 Interfacial friction in horizontal flow Basic   
B-6 Interfacial friction in vertical flow Basic   
I-9 Intermittent 2-phase natural circula-
tion 
ITF 
PWR-
OTSG 
 
S-30 Internal pump behavior (specific ge-
ometry) [added phenomenon]   
SETF ABWR 
Also AP-1000 
S-31 Jet pump behavior SETF BWR  
S-32 Liquid accumulation in horizontal SG 
tubes 
ITF 
PWR-
VVER 
 
 Liquid carry-over 
  
See Entrainment & I-
24-steam binding 
 
 
ID 
PHENOMENA – TABLE 1  PART 2 
OF 2 
TYPE REACTOR DETAILS & NOTES 
A-10 Liquid temperature stratification Advanced Reactors Also containment  
S-33 Liquid-Vapor mixing with condensa-
tion-Core 
SETF 
 
 
S-34 Liquid-Vapor mixing with condensa-
tion-Downcomer* 
 
Also ITF. * Including cold-hot 
liquid mixing (3D effect) 
S-35 Liquid-Vapor mixing with condensa-
tion-ECCI in HL and CL* 
PWR 
S-36 Liquid-Vapor mixing with condensa-
tion-Lower plenum* 
 
S-37 Liquid-Vapor mixing with condensa-
tion-SG mixing chamber 
PWR 
 
S-38 Liquid-Vapor mixing with condensa-
tion-UP 
 
 
S-39 Loop seal filling and clearance  SETF PWR Also ITF 
S-40 Lower plenum entrainment SETF PWR  
S-41 Lower plenum flashing SETF  See also Blowdown 
 Mixture level & entrainment-Core, 
downcomer and SG SS 
ITF  
See Phase separation 
I-10 Natural circulation (NC), 1-phase & 2-
phase-PS & SS  
ITF 
 
 
SS only for PWR  
I-11 NC core and downcomer BWR  
I-12 NC core bypass, hot and cold bundles BWR, 
CANDU* 
*also RBMK 
I-13 NC core, gap, downcomer, dummy 
elements  
PWR-
VVER 
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I-14 NC core, vent valves, downcomer PWR-
OTSG 
 
I-15 NC with horizontal SG PWR-
VVER 
 
A-11 NC RPV and containment systems & 
various system configurations  
Advanced Reactors  
Also containment 
S-42 Natural convection and H2 distribution SETF  Inside containment 
S-43 Non condensable gas effect including 
condensation HT in RCS 
SETF PWR 
Also ITF 
 Nuclear fuel behavior   
SETF/ITF 
See I-29- nuclear fuel feed-
back 
I-16 Nuclear thermal-hydraulics feedback 
and spatial effect (see also I-29-
nuclear fuel feed-back) 
ITF BWR 
Also RBMK, ABWR, etc. 
 Nuclear thermal-hydraulics instabili-
ties 
ITF BWR 
See I-16 and S-44 
S-44 Parallel channel effects and instabili-
ties (PCEI) 
SETF BWR 
 
S-45 Phase separation at branches (includ-
ing effect on two-phase critical flow)  
SETF  
Also ITF (T-branches) 
S-46 Phase separation/vertical flow with 
and w/o mixture level-Core    
SETF 
 
Also ITF 
S-47 Phase separation/vertical flow with 
and w/o mixture level-Downcomer 
 
 
S-48 Phase separation/vertical flow with 
and w/o mixture level-Pipes & Plena 
 
 
I-17 Pool formation in UP 
ITF PWR 
See also S-8- CCF/CCFL-
Upper core tie plate 
B-7 Pressure drops at geometric disconti-
nuities, including containment 
Basic  
Also Advanced  Reactors  
B-8 Pressure wave propagation  Basic  
I-18 Pressure-temperature increase & boil-
ing due to energy and mass input  
ITF  
Containment & Shutdown 
I-19 PRZ thermal-hydraulics ITF PWR  
S-49 Quench Front (QF) propaga-
tion/rewet-Fuel rods 
SETF 
 
 
S-50 QF propagation/rewet-Channel walls, 
Water rods 
BWR 
 
I-20 Refill including loop refill in PWR-
OTSG ITF 
 
Phenomenological time win-
dow rather than phenome-
non I-21 Reflood  
I-22 Reflux condenser mode and CCFL ITF PWR  
 Return to Nucleate Boiling (RNB)   See Reflood & Quench Front 
S-51 Separator behaviour (&* flooding, 
steam penetration, liquid carry-over) 
SETF  
*Mainly for BWR 
I-23 SG siphon draining (SG interaction 
with Engineered Safety Features, in-
cluding gravity driven) 
ITF PWR 
Shutdown conditions 
S-52 Spray effects-Core (including cooling 
and distribution)  
SETF 
BWR 
 
S-53 Spray effects-OTSG SS PWR-
OTSG 
 
S-54 Spray effects-PRZ PWR  
I-24 Steam binding (liquid carry-over, etc.)  ITF PWR  
S-55 Steam dryer behavior SETF  Mainly BWR  
I-25 Steam line dynamics ITF BWR  
S-56 Stratification in horizontal flow-Pipes 
(in 1-phase & 2-phase conditions) 
SETF  
Also ITF 
A-12 Stratification of boron 
Advanced Reactors  
See S-2- Boron mixing and 
transport 
I-26 Structural heat and heat losses ITF  Scaling issue 
I-27 Surge line hydraulics ITF PWR  
I-28 Superheating in OTSG SS 
ITF 
PWR-
OTSG 
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I-29 Thermal-hydraulics – Nuclear fuel 
feedback (see also I-16 Nuclear TH 
feed-back) 
ITF PWR 
Also CANDU, Pressurized 
Heavy Water Reactor de-
signed by KWU, etc.  
S-57 Thermal-hydraulics of horizontal SG, 
PS and SS 
SETF 
PWR-
VVER 
 
S-58 Thermal-hydraulics of OTSG, PS and 
SS  
SETF 
PWR-
OTSG 
See spray effect OTSG 
S-59 Two-Phase Critical Flow (TPCF)-
Breaks 
SETF 
 
 
S-60 TPCF-Pipes   
S-61 TPCF-Valves   
A-13 Tracking of non-condensable gases    
Advanced Reactors  
See S-43-Non- condensable 
gas effect including conden-
sation HT in RCS & con-
tainment  
 Valve leak flow (connected with con-
struction, operation, maintenance) 
ITF  
See  also Two-Phase Critical 
Flow Valves 
 Vapor (or steam) carry-under 
ITF  
See S-51-Separator Behav-
iour & I-10-Natural Circula-
tion 
 Vapor pull-through 
SETF  
See S-45- Phase separation 
at branches 
I-30 Void collapse and temperature distri-
bution during pressurization 
ITF BWR 
Also basic condensation 
B-9 Wall to fluid friction Basic   
 Water accumulation in horizontal SG 
tubes 
ITF 
PWR-
VVER 
See liquid accumulation S-32 
 
Three phenomena have been added which are not explicitly reported in the list of original 
documents; these are indicated in green lines in Table 1.  
In some cases, the distinction between ITF and SETF phenomena is only formal; there 
should be no consequences in the application of the related information.   
Table 1 includes 113 ‘independent-phenomena’: 
- 9 basic phenomena (B-1 to B-9) originated from the OECD SETF report [3] 
-  61 SET phenomena (S-1 to S-61): 58 originated from the OECD SETF report [3] plus 3 
added phenomena (S-25-Horizontal heated channel HT, S-30-Internal pump behavior 
(specific geometry) and S-42-Natural convection and H2 distribution, green lines in Table 
1) within the present context and dealing with horizontal heated channels, internal pumps 
and convection flows inside the containment     
- 30 IT phenomena (I-1 to I-30) originated from the OECD ITF report [4,5] 
- 13  ‘Advanced Reactor’ phenomena (A-1 to A-13) derived from above cited OECD and 
IAEA documents [8-13]; these phenomena plus the S-42-Natural convection and H2 dis-
tribution mentioned above, are assumed to characterize the containment performance, 
too. 
The considered phenomena for the ‘advanced reactor’ phenomena, plus the S-42 phenome-
non (already mentioned), are assumed to characterize reactor containment scenarios, too. 
These include full pressure and pressure suppression containment and the bubble con-
denser installed in some VVER-440 NPP. However, no phenomenon is related to the ice-
condenser containments, which are excluded from the present framework. 
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3 Conclusions 
Thermal-hydraulic phenomena have been collected from OECD/NEA-CSNI and IAEA docu-
ments covering design basis accidents or courses of events ‘before loss of core integrity’. 
The same phenomena may be important in different evolutions of two-phase flows. This col-
lection of phenomena can be used to prove the applicability and quality of best-estimate 
computer codes. Items of the present paper can be summarized as follows: 
 113 phenomena in Table 1. 
 12 water cooled reactor designs: PWR-U-tube steam generator, PWR-once-through 
steam generator, PWR-horizontal steam generator (VVER-440 and VVER-1000), 
BWR, CANDU, PHWR and RBMK, plus AP1000, APR1400, EPR, ESBWR, ABWR, 
and Small Modular Reactors, e.g. SMART MASLWR. 
 
The phenomena are identified from experiments and expertise, which are continuously up-
dated. Objective of this activity is to show that the list of phenomena is applicable to the en-
tire class of water-cooled reactors. Variables as results of a computer code application to 
NPP analyses are to be associated to phenomena. All identified phenomena shall be mod-
elled according to the state of the art knowledge. System thermal-hydraulics codes constitute 
the source of expertise associated with considered phenomena and the best and unique tool 
to calculate accident scenarios, including the course of events. 
Notes are added to point out similarities, rather than reducing the number of phenomena.  
Importance is given to experimental programs, like data or information from the Bubble Con-
denser (containment type) facility in Russia, BETHSY, CCTF, LSTF, PKL, LOBI, ATLAS, 
UPTF, and PSB experiments, in addition to data measured in NPPs, e.g. Doel-2 Steam 
Generator Tube Rupture. 
The knowledge and the understanding of phenomena is a prerequisite for performing mean-
ingful accident analysis. The presented information can be used as part of the qualification 
process for system code calculations; this may constitute a guidance to formulate and to ad-
dress the following issues or questions in relation to each NPP accident scenario calculation: 
a. What are phenomena expected to be relevant in the scenario? The list in Table 1 can be 
considered; in general, all phenomena should be considered. 
b. Are any of the phenomena expected to be relevant in the scenario under consideration? 
For instance, in case of small break LOCA with two-phase conditions occurring in the hot leg 
of a PWR, importance should be given to the phenomenon ‘counter-current steam-water 
flow’. What kind of equations or equation parameters are necessary to account for those 
phenomena? 
c. What is the qualification base for the phenomena expected to be relevant? What kind of 
experiments may be used to demonstrate a suitable knowledge for the phenomenon includ-
ing addressing the scaling issue? 
A qualified code calculation needs appropriate answers to these questions. 
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